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NAVAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND BRAZIL DURING THE 
COLD WAR: THE CASE OF THE PURCHASE 
OF THE VOSPER FRIGATES 
João Roberto Martins Filho1
In this article we analyze the case of the acquisition of Vosper frigates 
by the Brazilian Navy in the early 1970’s. We believe the process of purchase 
of these ships not only sheds light on naval issues, but also on foreign policy, 
by revealing the dispute for the Brazilian military market by the United King-
dom, since the late 1940’s. Since then, it is clear that the United Kingdom did 
not conform with the United States monopoly in providing weapons to Brazil. 
In spite of adverse conditions, marked by the American willingness to provide 
obsolete ships for our navy through investments with no return, British diplo-
macy took care of relations with our naval force, carefully examining the signs 
of dissatisfaction in officers and waiting for the moment to resume old dating 
back to the time of our Independence. Although the issue does not appear 
in our international relations theory and text production, the purchase of the 
frigates was considered a strategic point for the relations between both Brazil 
and the United Kingdom. In our perspective, it anticipated in a few years the 
rapprochement with Europe, dated to the years in charge of President Geisel.2 
1   Associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences and of the Political Science Docto-
ral Program of the Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar). He has occupied the Cátedra 
Rio Branco in International Relations at King´s College, London, and the Cátedra Rui Barbosa 
of Brazilian Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands. E-mail: djrm@ufscar.br
2  To address this issue, one must face the theme of the relationship between the Navy, tech-
nology and policy, which includes the understanding of naval decision-making process, the 
issue of innovation contained in the imports of naval equipment and relations between state 
and shipbuilding industry in developed countries. Our analysis is based both on official sourc-
es from the Brazilian Navy and interviews conducted by the author with the naval officers, 
as in British diplomatic documentation. This article was supported by FAPESP (process 
2011/07520-4). The opinions, assumptions and conclusions or recommendations expressed 
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By ignoring the question of the purchase of weapons, the text pro-
duction on Brazilian foreign policy in the dictatorial period missed an im-
portant aspect of the relationship between the authoritarian Brazil and the 
European democracies. The few authors who have focused on the so-called 
“European dimension” of our foreign policy tended to locate its emergence 
in a subsequent period to the purchase of the frigates. For them, it is a Gei-
sel´s government phenomenon, with its foreign policy of detachment from 
the United States and its internal policy of detente. Thus, according to one of 
these authors:
The approach to the capitalist democracies of Western Europe had dual 
purpose: it meant a great relativization of the US presence on the domestic 
political scene (...) and indicated to the most favorable sectors to liberali-
zation that the regime effectively was democratizing itself, so much that it 
was being accepted by important democratic governments.3
However, in the case of Britain, it is possible to say that a pinnacle in 
trade relations was in the Medici administration, when the sale of military 
equipment hereby mentioned happenned. These trades represented a context 
of search for autonomy by many developing countries, which led them to seek 
an alternative to the transfer of obsolete naval material, American or Soviet.4 
The domestic decision-making process
In the case of Navies such as the Brazilian, the relative autonomy en-
joyed by the armed forces within the state and the lack of concern of society 
and non-military institutions with defense makes the decision-making pro-
cess related to the purchase of warships and other equipment remain essen-
tially a naval force task. In general, this process has it origins in ideas arising 
within the naval engineering sectors. Those manage or not to convince the 
upper echelons of the need to make acquisitions. Both from the engineers 
hereby are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of FAPESP. The author 
is a researcher at CNPq. I thank Ludolf Waldmann for his careful reading of the first version.
3  Antonio C. M. Lessa, Brasil, Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental no contexto do nacional-desen-
volvimentismo: estratégias de diversificação de parcerias: 1974-1979. Masters dissertation, UNB, 
Brasília, 1994, p.94 and p.290.
4 Sami Faltas refers to “Indonesia and several Latin American countries” that “had turned 
to Western European sources to supplement their U.S-supplied equipment” anticipating an 
option later adopted by India, Taiwan an Egypt. See Arms markets and armament policy: the 
changing structure of naval industries in Western Europe, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus 
Nijhohh, 1986, p.59.
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and from the hierarchy, generally divergent groups are formed around the 
options placed on the table and/or how to acquire them: by donation or pur-
chase, in this or that country. These groups constitute what we will hence-
forth call the “technological parties”, which may or may not express deepest 
disagreements, being political differences or different naval strategies. Once 
approved by the Navy hierarchy, their aspirations are taken to the federal gov-
ernment. The case of the acquisition of the frigates was no different.5
After World War II, the Brazilian Navy started to receive secondhand 
American ships, mostly destroyers, practically donated to the country through 
the lend-lease arrangements made in the time of the conflict. Dissatisfaction 
with these ships, which at first was a significant technological advance for our 
Navy, was already visible in the late 1950’s, especially among Navy engineers. 
Thus, Admiral Coelho, chairman of the Frigates Construction Comission in 
the UK in the early 1970’s, argued that the US ships received during and after 
the Second World War “never represented necessarily what the Navy needed” 
mainly because they were designed for the needs of another country and in 
other strategic context.6 According to the Admiral, the US was surprised by 
Brazilian aspirations. Nonetheless, since 1961, the construction of escort ves-
sels in the country started to be contained in plans of the General Staff of the 
Navy (EMA). This was followed by studies conducted at the Naval War School 
about the needs of ships for the Navy, within the maritime traffic protection 
strategy in the South Atlantic.
Under President João Goulart’s administration, the EMA and the 
Minister of the Navy, Admiral Paul Bosísio, approved studies that predicted 
the future need of 28 frigates to fulfill the mission. In late 1963, the Minis-
ter Sylvio Motta supported the idea of drawing up a multiannual program of 
investments and funding of defense, set up in the first naval Director Plan, 
5  The frigates are escort vessels, both for anti-submarine use and general employment. Before 
its acquisition, the skeleton of the Brazilian fleet consisted of other escort ships, known during 
the war as escort destroyers and later simply as destroyers. These ships basically fulfilled typical 
functions of anti-submarine warfare, strategy attributed to Brazil by the United States in the 
context of South Atlantic defense in an eventual global war between the two sides of the Cold 
War. The Navy also had two cruisers - Barroso and Tamandaré - the first being the flagship of 
the fleet. The second hosted President Carlos Luz in the crisis that preceded the inauguration 
of Juscelino Kubitschek, known as the “General Lott’s preemptive strike”. See Julio de Sá Bier-
renbach, 1954-1964: a political decade, Rio de Janeiro, Public Domain, 1996, p.34.
6  Admiral Coelho started in 1959 the first contacts with the US Navy to build in Brazil, with 
US support, escort vessels better suited to Brazilian needs. See José Carlos Coelho de Sousa, 
A History of the frigates, Rio de Janeiro, Naval Club Publisher 2001, p.8. This book is the main 
source on the case examined here. It was supplemented with both interviews and question-
naires addressed to the official directly involved in the process, from a list obtained from the 
naval officers.
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which despite its clear limitations, “was, after all, a basis of thought and action 
to the Navy in its entirety, not just a small group of potential leaders”, which 
for some officers would have been a plan “beyond political and ideological 
differences”.7
After the 1964 coup d’état, Admiral Mello Baptista replaced Admiral 
Motta and previous plans were temporarily suspended for having as patron an 
Admiral who was minister in the deposed regime. The Baptist administration 
expressed the views of the most radical sectors of the Navy. At the same time, 
President Marshal Castello Branco appointed former Minister Paulo Bosísio 
to the place of Marshal Taurino de Resende in the final stage of Investigations 
General Committee in charge of recommending political and military rights 
repeals to the ones accused of having ties to the Goulart government. In the 
context of the time, Bosísio was seen as a moderate.8
Soon after, in January 1965, the President brought him back to the 
ministry of the Navy, amid the crisis between the Navy and the Brazilian Air 
Force, given the presidential decision to destine the air parcel of the three 
forces to the Air Force - the so-called “ship aviation crisis” considered by Viana 
Filho the longest and most difficult crisis faced until then by the President.9 
According to the chief of staff, the Admiral agreed with change proposed by 
the President: “For him, the solution met the principle of economy of means, 
avoiding the existence of aircraft from the Navy and from the Army, and en-
sured air coverage needed to the surface and sea forces of the Navy, since the 
planes of the Fleet, although belonging to the Air Force, obeyed the command 
of the Naval Force, while on operations”.10
7  Mozart Padilha de Souza, “O Plano Diretor: realidades e perspectivas da Marinha”, Revista 
Marítima Brasileira, 2. Trimester 1971, p.108-114, p.110.
8  Luis Viana Filho caracterized him as an” illustrious Navy official”, prudent and moderate and 
supporter of the measure taken by Castello Branco give the Air Force the exclusivity of carrier 
aviation, as appropriate action for the rationalizing of means. See O governo Castelo Branco, Rio 
de Janeiro, Biblioteca do Exército e Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1975, vol. I. p. 202. See also 
John W. Foster Dulles, President Castello Branco: Brazilian Reformer, College Station, Texas A & 
M University Press, 1980, p.78 et seq.
9  See op. cit., p.204. Dated January 6, 1965, US Embassy document to the State Department 
reported a conversation with Commander Julio Pessoa, a President Castelo Branco’s assistant. 
To Pessoa, “the President would not be popular in the Navy because he defends the creation of 
a Ministry of Defense”, but Castelo “does not feel that such dissatisfaction would rise to dan-
gerous levels.” Also according to the American version of the conversation with the Brazilian 
official, President believed that the Ministry of Defense was an economic necessity and would 
eventually be created, but considered that the Navy opposition would be able to block it. By 
then, Castelo wanted to keep the minister Mello Baptista, despite rumors about his retirement. 
“Airgram n. A-697”, generously given to the author by researcher Carlos Fico.
10  Luís Viana Filho, op. cit., p.203. As result of the presidential decision, the Navy would main-
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Notwithstanding, the Navy was in a tense situation. The inauguration 
of the Minister was marked by a violent speech by his predecessor. Bosísio 
took over defending the unity: “Two aspects - said while in his inauguration 
- will guide my administration: union and cohesion within the Navy and the 
union between the Navy and the other armed forces”.11 Mello Baptista repre-
sented since the mid-1950’s the extreme right, more used to politics than to 
force modernization.12 In June 1965, the main ally of Motta, Admiral Rade-
maker, was punished by the new Minister, with the support of significant 
sections of officialdom. He allegedly made critical comments on the Castello 
Branco administration.13
The inauguration of the former Minister of Goulart turned out to be 
an indispensable step towards naval modernization. The wider context was 
given by the progress of administrative methods adopted by the new regime, 
especially the concept of programme budgeting from the USA.14 In this con-
text, the Minister Bosísio resumed the aforementioned Director Plan.15 Aside 
expertise boards in the Navy, a group was created just to take care of shipbuild-
ing. This group should define, for the first time in Navy history, the type of 
ships that would be built, and should also budget the acquisition plan for sub-
tain the helicopters and the Armed Forces would be with fixed-wing aircraft.
11  Cited in Viana Filho, op. cit., p.204. Also see Foster Dulles, op. cit., p.114.
12  Former President Geisel recalled in his testimony to CPDOC researchers that the Admiral 
integrated, since the 1950’s, with his colleagues Rademaker, Aaron Reis, Saldanha da Gama 
and Mario Cavalcanti, the “group of Dionnes”, the most radical Navy group, referring to the five 
twins born in Canada. View Maria Celina D’Araujo and Celso Castro (eds.), Ernesto Geisel, Rio 
de Janeiro, Editora Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1997, p.219.
13  Ibid, p.142. Rademaker would later be Minister of the Navy of government Costa e Silva, 
composing in 1969 the military triumvirate that replaced the President when he turned away 
for health reasons, to the possession of the Médici general. In the government of Médici, he 
was Vice President.
14  For the Navy, such efforts were “precursors of its implementation in the Brazilian govern-
ment, in anticipation of the adoption by the Executive”. See Mauro Brazil, “Considerações so-
bre o Plano Diretor da Marinha”, Revista Marítima Brasileira, 2. Trimester 1971, p.115-128, p.116.
15  According to a source from the Navy, “the emphasis on budget discipline and planning as 
a global instrument of action of the Government allowed it to be reborn as early as 1965 with 
enlarged prospects. New policies and guidelines had been established, guiding the formulation 
of Basic Plans. There was determined commitment to give the Plan a permanent structure, by 
developing a Systematic Detailed and setting up a Coordination and Control Group, subordi-
nated to the Navy General Secretariat”, see Mozart Padilha de Souza, op. cit., p.110. Another 
author points out that “at the end of 1966, a committee appointed by the then Minister of Ma-
rine devoted to the systematic revision in the Director Plan, in order to remove the flaws so far 
observed and harmonize the Navy plans with the proposed programme budget technique.” In 
this process, the PD is no longer seen as a document going to be seen as a systematic planning. 
Mauro Brazil, op. cit., p.118.
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mission to the Presidency.16 Hence arose the Ten-Year Navy Program of 1967. 
There is no evidence that this plan was linked to any revision of the naval 
strategic doctrine, then focused on anti-submarine warfare. The factors that 
originated it were more related to the difficulties posed by the United States 
to acquire modern equipment, visible especially after the obstacles placed by 
Congress on military sales to Latin America in the context of conflict between 
the legislative and executive powers, caused by the Vietnam War.17  Issues 
such as the ban on American equipment use against ships from the same 
source (even fishing boats), and the difficulty of getting spare parts for the old 
vessels transferred by the US also weighed in the decision.18
The Ten-Year Program envisaged the construction of 10 frigates, and 
13 other types of boats.19 Regarding the former, the initial guideline of EMA 
stated that they should already be in service in their marines.20 Shipyards in 
the Netherlands, Germany and the United States sent visit invitations to the 
Navy. In July 1967, the then commanders Coelho and Vidigal were appointed 
by Admiral Rademaker, then minister of the Navy under Costa e Silva admin-
16  Coelho de Sousa, op. cit., p.13-15.
17  See John Roberto Martins Filho, “As políticas militares dos EUA para a América Latina, 
1947-1989”, Teoria & Pesquisa, 46: 101-135, jan. 2005. Indeed, US diplomatic documents since 
1966 show a tense climate between Brazil and the US on the issue of armaments. In late 1966, 
the Embassy of Brazil in Washington document, written in Portuguese and available in the US 
diplomatic files mentioned “the establishment of restrictions on military aid to Latin America 
imposed by Law 89-583 of 19 September 1966”. See “Aide-Mémoire”, Washington DC, in Oc-
tober 27, 1966, assigned to the author by Carlos Fico.
18  For Commander Fernando, finding that the ban could create problems to the fishing inspec-
tion activities in Brazilian waters emerged from the so-called “lobster war” conflict by France, 
in the early 1960’s. As for difficulties in the maintenance area, the same source mentioned the 
practice of the US Navy to move its inventory of parts of ships taken out of service to private 
dealers, which made the purchase very expensive. Testimony of Commander Fernando Costa 
to the author, Rio de Janeiro, Naval Club, July 15, 2008. Ludolf Waldmann Junior remembered 
that, with the lobster war, the US ended up in an unusual situation: either supported France - 
then part of NATO - or Brazil by the Rio Treaty. Eventually require that Brazil did not use the 
leased ships. Brazil rejected the demand mentioning the Rio Treaty in its defense. See “Tecn-
ologia naval e política: o caso da Marinha brasileira na era dos contratorpedeiros, 1942-1970”, 
Masters dissertation, UFSCAR, 2013, p..119.
19  For the then captain of corvette Lafayette Paulo Pinto the initial program involved the acqui-
sition of 20 frigates. The official presented comparative tables of the original plans and what 
was actually approved by the government Castello Branco in em “A Marinha e a construção de 
navios de guerra no Brasil”, Revista Marítima Brasileira, 2. Trimester 1974, pp. 19-44. According 
to the captain Fernando Costa, chief of staff of the head of EMA, Admiral Moreira Maia at the 
time, the approval of the program was “the last government act signed by President Castelo 
Branco and was brought to him by the minister Roberto Campos.” Testimony quoted.
20  Coelho de Sousa, op.cit.,p.16.
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istration, to visit four countries.21 In August, at a meeting with the Minister, it 
is decided to make contact with the US Navy in order to establish the manu-
facture of two Bronstein frigates in Brazil. 
At that time, it started to become clear to the involved officers that 
the United States, having proved to be unwilling to solve the problem of fi-
nancing, had no interest in meeting the Brazilian expectations. In this con-
text, the general secretary of the Navy, Admiral Adalberto Nunes de Barros, 
formed a working group with representatives from all sectors of government 
that would have to approve the external financing. The working group be-
came then an inter-ministerial commission. In August 1968, a year after the 
choice of Bronstein, the US had not yet presented a proposal for funding. 
According to Admiral Coelho’s report, the support of Admiral Nunes (now 
the head of EMA) and Admirals Carlos Auto and Hernani Goulart Fortuna 
(EMA members) was decisive for the decision to review the idea of acquiring 
frigates already in use. They decided then to purchase a new design of ship, 
with equipments identified as state of the art.22
The decision was a landmark in the history of the Navy.23 New nego-
tiations with the United States confirmed that the question of funding would 
not be solved, strengthening the pro-European position of Admiral Nunes. 
24With the succession crisis of President Costa e Silva, in September-October 
1969, the last decision of the Minister Rademaker was the cancellation of the 
choice of Bronstein and the breach of the American option.25
Early in the Medici government, thanks to the work of the aforemen-
tioned officers, the then Minister Adalberto Nunes drafted an explanatory 
21  On that occasion, the Hamilton frigates were examined (USA), Leander (Great Britain), but 
not Van Speik (Netherlands) and Cologne (Germany), which were not in the port. Idem, p.22-
25. In this text we will follow the usual naval formality of calling “lieutenants” the initial three 
stations of career; of “commanders” the corvette captain stations, frigate captain and captain of 
sea and war and “admirals” the three general officer of the Navy posts.
22  Basically, this meant that the propulsion was the mixed CODOG (Combined Diesel or 
Gas Turbine), and the frigate would feature computerized naval tactical systems, Ikara rocket 
launchers, anti-submarine helicopters with MK-44 torpedoes, advanced sonar systems, an-
ti-submarine torpedoes, Seacat anti-air defense missiles. Sousa Coelho, op. cit., p.33-37.
23  For Sousa Coelho, it was over, thus, “with guinea complex, which in the past led to exces-
sively timid and ultra-conservative choices”. See op. cit., p.33.
24  Believing in the British diplomatic documents that will be later examined, Admiral Nunes 
was not only pro-Europe but decidedly pro-British. Anyway, he was a firm supporter of auton-
omy from the United States. In the inaugural lecture which issued the April 30, 1970 at the 
Naval War College, he alluded “to the demands imposed by the need to create an effective naval 
power and of our own (emphasis given by him) - consistent with reality and national possibili-
ties” for defend the optimization of administrative processes. See Mauro Brazil, op. cit., p.116.
25  Idem, p. 38.
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memorandum requesting authorization to hire financing of up to US$ 250 
million for the purchase of 10 frigates. As we shall see further in the text, in 
diplomatic backstage, Britain had already presented attractive terms of financ-
ing, in the midst of negotiations for the purchase by Brazil of the Oberon class 
submarines. The President gave the green light. The EMA then approved the 
data-sheet, sent to shipyards abroad. The subject interested the main Europe-
an shipyards.26 After further visits to European shipyards, the Navy Material 
General Direction chose as finalists the firms Vickers, Yarrow, Vosper Thorni-
croft and Blohm und Voss. It is clear by then that the US$ 25 million available 
for acquisitions would be enough only for the purchase of six frigates. In 
the end, according to the official version of the Navy, the financing condi-
tions were the most important: it was decided that English frigates would be 
bought, in a negotioation with the Vosper shipyard.27 However, this version 
should be taken with caution. In large naval acquisitions, this rationality not 
always prevails. As we shall see, by examining the British diplomatic docu-
ments, influential sectors of the Navy had always preferred Vosper.
In June 1970, a Brazilian delegation went to England to inform 
Vosper of the intention to acquire six frigates. It consisted of Admirals Coelho 
and Alcantara and members of the inter-ministerial group aforementioned. 
According to the first, the decision to build two frigates in the country, in re-
sponse to the shipyard posture, which stated that it had no interest in building 
more than four vessels to a single client, was an impromptu decition and did 
not constitute intentional aspect of technological autonomy policy.28 Thus, out 
of six frigates, four would be manufactured in Woolston shipyard, near South-
ampton, and two in the Navy Arsenal of Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ). On further 
examination of the British documentation that aspect would be confirmed.
In August, the final version of the contract was concluded and signed 
with pomp and a big ceremony, as we shall see in the next part. The deal was 
26  In the UK, Swan Hunter, Cammell Laird, Scotts, Yarrow, Vosper Tornycroft and Vickers; 
in Germany, Blohm und Voss associated with its biggest rival Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft; 
Italy, Vantieri navale del Tirreni and Riuniti, and the Netherlands the Verolme. Ibid, p.40.
27  Idem, p.40-45. For Commander Fernando, “what came here to be traded was not the Mark-
10 frigate, but the Mark-11 frigate, which is the class bought by Argentina, Hercules class. This 
was the project that Vosper was developing with the MOD - I embarked in one of these frigates, 
Amazon class, project that was purchased and commissioned and worked a long time for the 
British Navy. The Mark-11 was a little larger than the Mark-10. The difference was more about 
concept, arms, etc., but it was a project given by the MOD to Vosper. The Brazilian option was 
the Mark-10 “. Statement given to the author.
28  Idem, p.64-66. To Admiral Armando Vidigal, “the decision, therefore, was not the result 
of a deliberate attempt to acquire the building technology of these vessels.” See A evolução do 
pensamento naval estratégico brasileiro: meados das décadas de 70 até os dias atuais, Rio de Janeiro, 
Clube Naval, 2002 p.11.
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seen at the time as “the largest made by South Coast shipyards and probably 
the largest by any British firm”, providing work in those facilities until 1979. 
A consortium of eight British banks provided the financing of around 100 
million pounds.29 The frigate Niterói (F-40), which gave its name to the class 
in Brazil, was thrown overboard in February 8, 1974 and incorporated in No-
vember 20, 1976, followed later by the Defender (F-41), Constitution (F- 42) 
and Liberal (F-43). In Brazil, Independence (F-44) and the EU (F-45) were 
built later. The names paid homage to vessels that participated in the war for 
independence in 1822 and 1823. Some might sound ironic, though, given the 
political regime in Brazil then.
From the United States to the United Kingdom
The purchase of the ships in Britain marked the end of an era. For 
the first time since the beginning of World War II, ships that would constitute 
the foundation of the Brazilian fleet were to be purchased in Europe, ending 
a period of obsolete destroyers transferred to the country by lend-lease.30 One 
could say that the acquisition of the frigates was a return to the period before 
World War I, when Brazil purchased the battleships Minas Gerais and São 
Paulo in England.31 As occurred in the early twentieth century, in the early 
1970’s, naval purchases constituted an important issue in relations between 
Brazil and Great Britain.
As stated in his memoirs, the British ambassador to Brazil at the time 
affirmed that British exports doubled in the passage from the 1960s to the 
1970s, and “this was helped a lot by such governmental purchases as, for 
example, those made by the Brazilian Navy”. In the same book, the diplomat 
celebrates the restoration of the relation between the Brazilian Navy and the 
British: “This admirable service is not only modeled very closely on the Royal 
Navy in matters of uniform but also has a great tradition of buying ships from 
Britain. When they decided to replace obsolete ships, we were fortunate in 
having an excellent type of frigate which was just what the Brazilians needed; 
they also bought three submarines from us”.32
More than two decades earlier, in early 1948, after selling 130 new 
29  “Vosper to sell Brazilian Navy £ 100m frigates”, The Times, September 30 1970.
30   As we shall see, an exception to this rule was the sale to Brazil in the mid-1950s Leviathan 
aircraft carrier, under construction, here baptized Minas Gerais.
31  See João Roberto Martins Filho, A Marinha brasileira na era dos encouraçados, 1895-1910, 
Rio de Janeiro, FGV, 2010.
32  Sir David Hunt, Memoirs: military and diplomatic, London, Trigraph, 2006, p. 311.
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military airplanes to Argentina, the British diplomacy pointed out the new 
situation: “By this policy of practically giving away war material, it looks as 
if the US Services Departments had found a means of cutting the ground 
from under the feet of any competitor and so ensuring that LA shall be re-
armed exclusively with US equipment”.33 The British dilemma as faced in Lat-
in America was resumed by the British diplomacy like this: “Few of the larger 
countries will want to tie themselves exclusively to the US chariot wheels. The 
problem for us is to retain a reasonable share of the trade in arms with LA 
without unduly indisposing the Americans”.34
During the Dutra administration (1945-1950), however, it was not 
possible to change the new framework. Only with the election of Vargas the 
British ambassador saw an outlook of improvement.35 However, with the sign-
ing of the Brazil-US Military Agreement, in March 15, 1952, it would soon be-
come clear that the new superpower was not willing to allow Britain to regain 
its former position as arms supplier to Brazil. On the other hand, the obso-
lete nature of the equipment assigned to Brazil would stimulate the Foreign 
Office not to abandon their expectations of exporting more modern military 
equipment for our country. The effort eventually resulted, at the end of 1952, 
in the sale of 70 Meteor airplanes to the Brazilian Air Force.36 Regarding the 
Navy, at the same time, the British naval attaché in Rio de Janeiro assessed: 
“We can not expect the US Naval Mission in Brazil to welcome our competi-
tion, but there is no reason why we should lose good business on account of 
the susceptibilities of the Americans”.37
In March 1945, the Foreign Office stated that it was essential to main-
tain a naval attaché in Brazil. With the creation of this post, Brazil was able to 
have its own naval attaché in London.38 However, in the early years after the 
33  FO371 / 68277, cited in Moura, “From ‘automatic alignment’ to ‘difficult pragmatism’: shifts 
in Brazilian foreign policy and Their impact on Anglo-Brazilian military contacts, 1945-1954”, 
London School of Economics & Political Science, MA International History, September, 1994, 
p.11. In its report for the period from January 1946 to March 1947, the British air attaché in our 
country mentioned possible outcomes of contacts to be made between the naval former attaché 
of Great Britain in Brazil, now representative of Hawker and senior FAB (FO371 / 61215, cited 
in Leandro Moura, p.12. In the same attaché report for 1949, there were new hopes of sales of 
aeronautical equipment to Brazil (FO371 / 81290, cited in idem).
34  FO371/61305, cited in Leandro Moura, op. cit., p.9.
35  Commenting an interview with the elected President in October 1950, in which he sug-
gested that Brazil could seek to Europe when it was not attended by the US in its economic 
assistance and technical expectations. Moura, op. cit., p.12. 
36  Moura, op. cit., p.15.
37  ADM166/6065, citado em Moura, op. cit., p.16.
38  Moura, op. cit., p.7.
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war, the attaché plowed into infertile soil, though not without better future 
harvest expectations. In his report on the period from January 1946 to June 
1947, he referred to the rumors that Brazil would be interested in acquiring 
“a small modern aircraft carrier”, seen as “an absolute necessity for the re-
quirements of their Navy,” although nothing concrete had been done.39 In 
February 1952, Her Majesty’s naval attaché referred to the Brazilian interest 
in fulfilling its shipbuilding program, which, in the view of the Brazilians, 
could “re-establish the political tradition of having units of the Brazilian Navy 
built once again in the British shipyards”.40 The program cited included the 
purchase of two light cruisers, one or two aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers and 
10 minesweepers.
Indeed, the late 1952 marked the exchange of letters between the na-
val attaché in Rio de Janeiro, H.C. Ranald41, and various government depart-
ments in London - Foreign Office, Admiralty, Ministry of Defence, the Treas-
ury Department - on the subject of selling six destroyers and the competition 
posed mainly by France, which would be willing to conduct business with the 
use of “barter with compensation”, which means that a part of the payment 
would be received in the form of goods, an option not offered by the British 
government. At that time, the attaché also considered as competitors of his 
country the Netherlands and the US. Three British shipyards - Armstrong, 
Yarrow and Samuel White - joined forces to present a proposal to Brazil42, but 
negotiations did not progress and the program was canceled.
In April 1954, the British Embassy in Brazil acknowledged the dis-
cussed terms. In the letter accompanying the British attaché’s annual report, 
the Embassador in Rio de Janeiro, Sir Geoffrey Thompson, admitted that, in 
his opinion, our Navy had no strategic relevance whatsoever to the Queen’s 
39  Moura, op. cit., p.12. Ludolf Waldmann noted that, in 1944, Getúlio Vargas urged the Unit-
ed States to transfer two aircraft carriers. It is the first time the acquisition of that ship appears 
from the then minister of naval program of the Navy, Admiral Alexandrino, in 1922. Then, in 
his ministerial report of 1945, Guilhem Admiral presented a naval program that included the 
acquisition of two passenger ships airfields Independence class by US transfer. See op. cit., pp. 
86-88.
40  ADM116/6065, citado em Moura, op. cit, p.14.
41  In a document from 1954, there is allusion to this oficial as naval, military and aeronautic 
attaché.
42  At the time, the usual accusations of corrupt practices in the negotiations were made by 
attache: “The most important fact that has come to light since my report of November 4 was 
the agreement by the three British agents to divert one percent of the contract value for the man 
who is in a position to advise the Minister of the Navy on the proposal to be accepted “(HBM 
Naval Attaché, Rio de Janeiro to The Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, 10th December, 
1952). See offices in ADM 1-23976, Sale of British warships to Brazilian Navy.
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plans, “since the United States had undertaken the primary responsibility for 
the reorganization of the defence of this part of the world”. As he concluded, 
“at present, therefore, the Brazilian Navy is primarily of interest to us as a 
possible market for the sale of British warships and auxiliary vessels”. Then 
the ambassador summed up the general framework of Anglo-Brazilian naval 
relations after the signing of the Brazil-US military agreements:
The chief difficulty in offering to sell ships and other naval equipment to 
the Brazilian navy is that the United States, who are anxious to keep the 
Brazilian Navy closely tied to their own, are likely as soon as they hear of 
British competition to offer similar equipment at knock-down prices and 
if they do there is nothing clearly that we or any other European power can 
do about it. Nonetheless, I think that it is worth while for us to continue to 
make bid as occasion offers, since it is always possible that the Brazilian 
navy may place an order in the United Kingdom, and, if or when this oc-
curs, we benefit economically and also earn some small dividend in a slight 
increase in influence.43
Finally, Ambassador talked about the good relations between the two 
Navies, using as an example the Brazilian good will to allow in their ports the 
stopover of British ships in transit to and from the Falkland Islands, unlike 
what happened with the Chilean Navy, and obviously, with the Argentinian. 
In a report of the end of March 1954, the attaché expressed the dismay of a 
naval force, which had already been the most powerful in the world and now 
had to content with a subordinate place against the US naval power:
The Navy is very pro-British and has a great respect and admiration for the 
Royal Navy and its traditions. The Brazilian Navy would like to model itself 
on ours because it realises that apart from tradition and experience our 
methods are very economical in manpower and therefore more suited to 
Brazil´s needs. In the circumstances this is not possible and the Brazilian 
Navy is now heavily indoctrinated with American ideas.44
Nevertheless, the beginning of 1954 marked the question of the pos-
sible purchase of a light aircraft carrier by the Navy of Brazil. The strategic 
43  “British Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Office”, April 12, 1954. FO 371-
108850, Annual reports for 1953 and 1954 for Brazilian Navy. In the report of March 31, 1954, 
the attaché showed concern and rumored about offers from France (destroyers and aircraft 
carriers), Netherlands (destroyers), Japan (aircraft carrier), Italy (submarines) and the United 
Kingdom itself (the six vessels mentioned above and “incomplete hull of the Leviathan light 
aircraft carrier”).
44  “Naval attaché, British Embassy, Rio de Janeiro to British Ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Thomp-
son”, FO 371-108850.
João Roberto Martins Filho
81
reasons for the acquisition were explained to the Foreign Office by the British 
ambassador in Rio de Janeiro:
The chances of this going through still seem remote, but from the political 
point of view it should be born in mind that that Brazil is very anxious to 
achieve a status of a major power and that the addition of an aircraft carrier 
to the Brazilian fleet would contribute substantially and strinkingly to this 
end and would enable them to be one up on the Argentines.45
Indeed, in January 1954, the British naval attaché reported to the De-
partment of Naval Intelligence in London contacts from the EMA in order 
to probe the British Navy on whether to offer the aircraft carrier Hercules to 
Brazil.46 For the attaché, the main reasons for this option were: 1) that such a 
ship would be essential for a modern Navy; 2) prestige (not acknowledged); 
3) the quality of British ships; 4) the affordability of Hercules; 5) the possibil-
ity of extending the payment period.47 According to the British official, the 
head of EMA, Admiral Atila Monteiro Aché, urgently needed a letter from 
the attaché explaining the offer of Hercules, which he intended to present 
to Minister Guillobel, as part of a document that exposed points that should 
be changed in the Ministry policy, in the view of the EMA Admirals. The 
attaché’s response once again brings to light the Anglo-American naval ten-
sions: according to the British official, he explained to the Brazilian Admiral 
that if the Admiralty authorized him to write the letter, it would be implicit 
that the letter “would not be used as a red cloak to infuriate the American Bull 
into offering a Carrier free, or cheap, or on loan for 20 years as I have heard 
rumours of such proposals”.
In response, the Brazilian Admiral supposedly said that the US never 
45  “British Embassy, Rio de Janeiro to American Department, Foreign Office”, January 8 1954. 
FO 371-108849, Negotiation for sale of aircraft carrier to BN. 
46  The ship was valued at £ 2 million in state he was in. It was expected that over 4 million 
pounds would be needed to complete it, which should only occur in late 1957 as the attaché 
claimed to have unofficially reported to the Navy Brazilian months before.
47  According to the attaché, the messenger of the EMA was the Director of Naval Aviation, 
Admiral Olavo de Araujo, for whom Guillobel Minister was becoming “too political, despite 
of the real interests of the Navy.” The main point of attack was the construction of numerous 
naval bases, even if the Navy had no ships to use them, rather than the acquisition of 10 heli-
copters and aircraft carriers. For the attaché, the revelation of these differences was much more 
than expected to hear. “Naval Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, to The Director of Naval Intelligence, 
Admiralty”, 11th December 1953. For a defense of the construction of these bases (“for the fu-
ture strength, own a great naval power and not to the current Brazil” ), see Renato de Almeida 
Guillobel, Some assessments of the naval administration, Rio de Janeiro, Naval Press, 1959, 
p.16. The bases in question were built in Val De Cans (Pará), Recife, Natal and Aratú (Bahia).
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would provide the carrier to Brazil, for they had already made clear that, in 
their view, “Brazil did not need naval aviation, let alone an aircraft carrier”. 
Such a statement would be anchored in the American strategy to get Brazil 
only to escort convoys from its coast, to the Caribbean, leaving the rest to the 
US Navy and would be seen by Brazilians as a “selfish and arrogant” attitude. 
For His Majesty’s attaché, “the Brazilian Navy does not want to be treated 
purely as a naval tool of the U.S.A. and considers that Brazil must be suitably 
armed to fight private wars if she wishes to do so, without American help”.48 
Finally, the attaché gave an assessment of Guillobel minister’s stance, divid-
ed, in his view, between the desire to mark his administration either for the 
purchase of the desired carrier or for the pressures of the head of American 
naval mission, Admiral Whitehead, as part of shortage of reserves, which put 
the Ministry of the Navy against the Ministry of Finance. 
The attaché’s office requested approval of the Admiralty and the Of-
fice for him to write the required letter, and concluded alluding to air material 
purchases that should follow the purchase of the carrier. A few days later, 
the embassy in Rio de Janeiro wrote to the Foreign Office warning that the 
delay in response placed the attaché in bad situation with the head of EMA. 
Demonstrating the importance that the British government gave to the sale, 
London’s answer came out immediately: “You may tell Brazilians that Levia-
than is available.”49 Three weeks later, the embassy informed London that in 
February 4, President Vargas had authorized the Minister of the Navy to buy 
the Leviathan at a cost of 7 million pounds.50 This was followed by an intense 
exchange of correspondence between Rio and London given the fact that the 
correct price was 9.9 million pounds, which shocked the EMA. Finally, in 
February 25, 1954, the Brazilian Navy received the Admiralty’s memorandum 
formally offering the ship.51 In December 1956, already in the Kubitschek ad-
48 In 1969, a US report would state that the Brazilian naval force had expectations of be-
coming a small force, but a modern one, and mentioned the opinion of at least one top naval 
officers, for whom “Brazil’s Navy officers could not sit on the beach and watch US Navy units 
patrolling its waters.” See US Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Re-
search Memorandum, RAR-14, August 25 1969. Ten years earlier, the holder of the Navy folder 
on the second Vargas referred to the commitments made by Americans during World War II , 
“of which, with the passage of time, and well according to your usual procedure for us, they so 
easily forgot.” See Guillobel, op. cit. , P.6.
49  “From Rio de Janeiro to Foreign Office”, January 15 1954 e “From Foreign Office to Rio de 
Janeiro”, January 15, 1954. FO 371-108849.
50   “From Rio de Janeiro do Foreign Office”, February 9, 1954. FO 371-108849.
51  “Admiralty to the Foreign Office”, 25th February, 1954. In March of that year, the Admiral-
ty, making the reservation that it should be heard in the choosing, listed the shipyards in the 
UK with experience in building aircraft carriers, which could finalize the Leviathan: Harland 
& Wolff (Belfast), Vickers Armstrong (both in Barrow as in Tyne), Fairfield, Swan Hunter & 
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ministration, the acquisition of a ship of the same class, the Vengeance, here 
baptized Minas Gerais, was completed.52
In the new British Naval attaché’s report for the year of 1954, be-
sides reporting positive changes occurred in the command of the Navy after 
Getulio Vargas’s suicide, talks about the alleged desire from a part of naval 
officers to escape the straitjacket of US aid returned: “There is a growing 
feeling amongst a number of Brazilian Naval officers, in particular the more 
far seeing Captains and Commanders, that they should once again model 
themselves upon the Royal Navy rather than upon the Navy of the United 
States”. To the official, the Brazilians resented the wasteful methods from the 
US Navy, and showed themselves susceptible in front of the arrogance of the 
Americans, who seemed likely to dictate the direction of the Brazilian Navy. 
However, he admitted that any change in the current situation could only be 
gradual and would depend on a reduction of size of the US naval mission in 
Brazil. 53
The Anglo-American tensions reappeared in 1963 when the British 
naval attaché in Rio de Janeiro received the request of the firm Shorts, from 
Belfast, who had been contacted by the Brazilian Navy, interested to know 
whether the missile Seacat could be installed on destroyers assigned by the 
USA. Consulted by the Foreign Office, in May, the Admiralty replied that “in 
general, it is not our policy actively to promote missile sales to Latin American 
countries”, but “as regards SEACAT for Brazil, it would be difficult to refuse a 
direct request for its sale if a firm order where to be placed”. It was suggested 
that the information should be provided without greater commitment, with 
the warning that some consideration should be given “to U.S. susceptibilities 
on this subject”, once “their policy statements indicate that they are opposed 
to the export of sophisticated weaponry to Latin America countries”.  The 
document concluded with doubts about whether Brazil was able to buy the 
missiles, given the political and economic instability of the country.
In September, Shorts Brothers warned the authorities that it had re-
ceived an urgent request from Brazil to present a proposal of sale of the Sea-
Wigham, Carmell Laird, John Brown, Alex Stephens & Sons and Hawthorne Leslie. See “For-
eign Office to Naval Attaché”, 15th March, 1954. FO 371-108849.
52  Ludolf Waldmann Júnior, op. cit., p.110.
53  The report is signed by the master J.C.Cockburn. Unlike the praise made by former attaché 
to the Minister of Marine Vargas, Renato de Almeida Guillobel, Cockburn depreciates him, 
praising the new minister, Admiral Edmundo Jordan Amorim do Valle, appointed by Café 
Filho. See “Naval Attaché, British Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, to British Ambassador”, December 
23, 1954, FO 371-108850. The captain of the British Navy is equivalent to our captain of sea and 
war.
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cats. In the following month, Ambassador Fry himself argued that the deal 
would be hard to refuse, given similar contacts with Chile and Argentina, but 
the internal situation in Brazil, “which some believe is now near to civil war”, 
could be an obstacle. The diplomat reminded that the weapons in question 
were basically defensive and that the Americans would not like it, but neither 
did the British government like it when they sold to aircraft the Australian. 
In 23 October, the Embassy reported that a group of Brazilian officials would 
visit the firm in Belfast and called for a clear position of London on the sale. 
The response of the Foreign Office came a week later:
For the moment, we cannot go further than the present formula that Shorts 
may tender subject to the approval of the UK government to supply. The 
Americans still take the view that Seacat contains American know-how and 
that we cannot release them to a third power without their permission on 
security grounds. Although we are in effect sidestepping their objections in 
the case of Chile, the Americans had not yet yielded.
The dispatch concluded with the observation that if a firm order from 
Brazil was presented, it would be necessary to consult the Americans and, 
“if the reaction is negative, take a decision whether we can ignore American 
objections”.54 With the advent of the military coup in Brazil, the deal was post-
poned. Finally, the country lowers its original ambitions to buy three Seacats 
missile stations, to be installed in Minas Gerais, and bought only one unit, 
which was installed in 1966, in the destroyer Mariz e Barros.55
In September 1965, the Arms Working Party, inter-ministerial or-
ganization overseeing arms sales in the British government, discussed the 
information from the naval attaché in Rio de Janeiro that the Brazilian Navy 
was interested in acquiring 12 antisubmarine frigates. For the attaché, Brazil 
would build the hulls and buy engines and equipment in the UK. At the time, 
the AWP discussed the objections of the Treasury, based on the economic 
situation in Brazil and the assent of the Foreign Office, according to which if 
the UK did not sell to Brazil, another country would do and the British Navy 
was interested in selling ship to our country.56 In 29 September, the British 
Embassy reported to London that a representative of Yarrow made in Rio de 
Janeiro a presentation of a frigate to the Shipbuilding Committee of the Bra-
zilian Navy. At the meeting, the Brazilians have confirmed their interest in 12 
54  About the dispatches referred to in this paragraph see FO 371-167927, Supply of arms to 
Brazilian Navy, 1963.
55  Ludolf Waldmann Júnior, op. cit., p.127.
56  “Extract from the minutes of Arms Working Party Meeting of 2-9-65”, FO 371-179273, Con-
struction of Yarrow Frigates in Brazil.
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antisubmarine frigates and suggested the British firm to present a proposal 
for sale. According to this source, the Brazilian Navy officers were interested 
in building one ship in the UK and the rest in Brazil, and mentioned the 
Mauá, Verolme, Ishikavajima shipyards, besides the Navy Arsenal itself. The 
representative of the English shipyard would have supposedly visited these 
firms.57 The subject returned to the AWP later that month and it was decided 
“to invite the Navy Department to continue their negotiations with the Brazil-
ians and to report developments to the Arms Working Party before entering 
into any firm commitments”.58
The British and the frigates sale
It took four years so that indications would come up that the labori-
ously maintained contacts after World War II were about to give more con-
crete results. In 1970, the British defense attaché, by introducing his annual 
report for 1969, after noting that the presence of the United States “has also 
largely dictated Brazilian choice in the organisation and equipment of their 
Armed Forces”, announced: “There are now signs that the Brazilians want to 
look elsewhere”.59  To the official, given the limitations of the national technol-
ogy, the Armed Forces would be breaking free of the American straight-jacket. 
For instance, in the naval plan, there would be orders for two submarines of 
the Oberon class, built by Vickers in Barrow-in-Furness, here baptized Hu-
maitá and Tonelero. Later in the same document, it was stated that relations 
with the US Navy would be “on the whole, good but there are signs of growing 
impatience with avuncular patronage”. Relations with the British Navy were 
seen as “very cordial”. 
57  “British Embassy to Foreign Office”, 29 September, 1965, FO 371-179273.
58  “Extract from minutes of Arms Working Party meeting of 28/9/65”, FO 371-179273.
59  “Report on Brazil Armed Forces”, FCO 7-1512, 1969. Later, he complimented: “The ser-
vices will continue to be oriented USA and, one suspects, irritated at the same time”. On the 
American side, in early 1968, a letter sent to the Secretary of State in charge of the Latin 
American region suggested that he informed the Brazilian ambassador, Leitão da Cunha Vasco 
“the difficult problems we are facing with Congress due to acquisition certain types of military 
equipment by Brazil and other countries in the Hemisphere”, while states:” We are hopeful 
that we can have a favorable determination soon, which will allow cooperation with Brazil 
in the construction of two destroyers of Bronstein class.” In the same text, it is clear that the 
American concern was the purchase of Brazilian jets in other countries, given the difficulties 
to acquire the F-5 Americans, suggesting to the Secretary to make clear to the ambassador that 
“all of our aid program external will be seriously affected by the Brazilian decision.” See ARA 
Covey T. Oliver to The Secretary, “Briefing Memorandum”, March 22, 1968, also assigned to 
the author by Carlos Fico.
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However, the most important was the selection of frigates from par-
ticular requirements, which, as expected by the attaché, British industry would 
be able to attend. In the part of the report dedicated to the Brazilian Navy, the 
attaché wrote down: “It is expected that during the 70´s about 50% of the 
present fleet will be scrapped while 56 new vessels should be commissioned”, 
and described the beginning of the acquisitions planned by the Ten-Year Pro-
gramme 1967-77, featuring orders for two minesweepers Schutze and the 
start of construction of six patrol boats in the Arsenal of Rio Navy, besides the 
rumours of modernization - with new electronics and possibly with missiles 
– of the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais and cruisers Tamandaré and Barroso. 
In the report body, the official reaffirmed the same: “there is the prospect of 
the UK selling a frigate design”. And he stated: “’First of class’ construction 
would be in UK - thereafter the remainder would be made in Brazil, possibly 
with outside assistance”.60
It also said that the decision on the frigates was delayed by the de-
parture of President Costa e Silva, in August 1969 (due to a stroke). With the 
tenure of General Medici, there were signs that the new Minister of Navy, Ad-
miral Adalberto Nunes de Barros had urgency to resolve the issue. However, 
he recognized that the choice was complex because it involved financial terms 
offered by the supplier nations, in this case the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Germany.61
For the British, the Navy was divided between two “schools of 
thought”, presented as follows: “The conservative one urging the selection of 
a well tried conventional design, and the more realistic on which wants to buy 
a modern design with a reasonably long expectation of useful life”.62 For the 
British officer, there were no significant political divisions in the Navy, sum-
ming up the internal tensions to possible conflicts of personalities.63
60  FCO 7-1512.
61  In the list of finalists, there were Bronstein, Leander, Köln, Mackenzie, Type 21 and Yarrow 
Mark 8. For a detailed description of the basic design of this frigate (Mark 1), see the probably 
paid article “A fragata Yarrow”, published in the journal Revista Marítima Brasileira, 2. Quarter 
1970, pp.126-133.
62  In the diplomatic documents exchanged between Rio and London, starting in July 1970, 
referring to the final financial arrangements for the sale of the frigates, one of the arguments 
used to convince London’s financial authorities on the need for flexibility in negotiations was 
the presence of a supposed “British faction” in the Brazilian Navy, which prefer “to order from 
countries Whose industry is strongly established locally”. See “Britnavatt, Rio de Janeiro to 
MOD”, 31 July 1970 Naval sales from United Kingdom, FCO 7-1511.
63  In his assessment, the Brazilian naval force admittedly had superior preparation than other 
Latin American navies, but the obsolete floating material harmed their performance. The Navy 
was considered as the most efficient of the three Brazilian armed forces.
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In the mid 1970’s, at the final stage of financial terms adjustments, 
there were intense exchange of telegrams between the embassy and several 
British government departments (besides the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, the Ministry of Defense and the Export Credits Guarantee Departa-
ment, and Treasury, which sent a representative to Rio) focusing on issues 
such as the increase of the maximum established for British exports to a par-
ticular country, the inclusion in the funding of costs of frigates to be built in 
Brazil, the inclusion of the funding of the Australian missile Ikara, and the 
total period of payment by Brazil. There were tripartite negotiations involving 
the ECGD, the Vospers shipyard, and the Finance Ministry and the Navy in 
Brazil, represented by Admiral Alcantara (Director General of Naval Materi-
al). In correspondence, the embassy insisted that the business of frigates was 
the largest made by the UK in recent years and that Brazil had increasingly 
solid economic and financial conditions. According to Brazilian sources, it 
involved 98.65 million pounds, and the fourth English frigate delivery time 
would be 351 weeks from the date of January 8, 1971.64
It is clear from the documentation that the idea to build two frigates 
in Brazil originated in Vosper’s lack of interest in compromising its shipyard 
with the construction of six ships for just one client, as well as the impossibil-
ity of another English shipyard (Vickers, mainly, whose representative in Rio 
also participated in some of the talks) to take part in the order. Still, resurfaced 
allusions to different positions within the Navy. In a telegram from the begin-
ning of August, Ambassador Hunt reports to London the results of the afore-
mentioned negotiations, saying that because of the ministerial decision by the 
formula 4 + 2, there were two streams of opinion in the naval force: on the 
one hand, older admirals denoted “strong preference” for the construction of 
all six frigates in the UK; on the other, there was “a small group of opinion, 
basically composed of young officers, to promote local construction because 
of nationalist reasons.” The letter concluded: “In the absence of any offer to 
build ships NOS 5 and 6 in the United Kingdom, the Navy resorted to local 
construction as the only solution which would allow one submission to the 
minister of finance in the near future”.65
Another important theme to be addressed in the same telegram was 
the need of the MOD to act more decisively towards the Vickers firm, for it 
to manifest as soon as possible about its interest in building the two frigates, 
so this issue could come to an end. It was clear at that time that the shipyard 
Vosper was only concerned with the four frigates under its responsibility, not 
64  Fernando Moraes Baptista da Costa, “Fragatas classe Niterói – 25 anos depois”, Revista 
Marítima Brasileira, 1. Trimester 1997:111-137, p.112.
65  Telegram from Sir David Hunt to ECGD, 4 de agosto de 1970 em FCO 7-1511.
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caring whether the other two would be made in Brazil or in the UK. The 
broader interests of the British government and the most immediate targets 
of the shipyards were quite clear.
Indeed, the British diplomacy had clear interest that the six ships were 
made in the UK. According to the ambassador, the Minister of the Navy’s de-
cision to make two ships in Rio de Janeiro represented “a less satisfactory 
position for us that the total supply, both military and tradewise.”66 However, 
once the decision to do two frigates in Rio was taken, there was an attempt 
to convince the financial experts in London to rethink the negotiations, de-
scribing the differences within the Brazilian government, divided, he said, 
between the clear choice of the Navy in favor of the UK, and the arguments 
of the Brazilian economic area, mainly the Finance Minister Delfim Netto, on 
whether to consider other suppliers. 
The possibility of reopening the bidding constituted a strong argu-
ment from the Ambassador to convince the trade officials to give in on minor 
points. Vigorous supporter of diplomacy as the preferred vehicle of the com-
mercial interests of his country, Sir David Hunt made clear his position on the 
importance of giving in to close the deal, “particularly when we consider that 
this would be a massive military engineering and technical consolidation of 
the trading bridgehead we have just recently established after a long time out 
of the market in these latter areas”.67 On the same day, the diplomat wrote to 
the Foreign Office:
The frigate deal is not only important in itself because of its size, but it is, 
in my view, the biggest single factor which will swing the decision whether 
we succeed in regaining our old position in Brazil. The Navy’s decision to 
come to us for their re-equipment has tremendous economic and political 
consequences.68
Referring to the good condition of the Anglo-Brazilian relations in 
the early 1970’s, he would claim some time later: “All this was much to my 
taste because, for some years now, I had been convinced that economics were 
really more important than politics”.  And completed: “As I used to say to my 
staff: ‘It is trade that pays for our salaries”.69 Soon after, the British Treasury 
66  Idem in FCO 7-1511.
67  Idem, in FCO 7-1511.
68  See telegram of 6 August FCO 7-1511. Twenty days later, celebrating the closing of the deal, 
Sir David Hunt wrote to FCO: “There should be a lot of naval sales to come, apart from the 
inevitable replacement business.” See telegram of August 25, 1970 in idem.
69  See Sir David Hunt, op. cit., p.311.
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Department gave the green light for the funding, with payment deadline of 
eight years, “as long as the contract is signed immediately.” On the same day, 
the ambassador in Rio referred to the desire expressed by Admiral de Sousa 
Coelho, appointed head of the frigates acquisition commission in the UK. His 
desire was that before the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
MOD advised the Navy in their subsequent relations with Vosper shipyard 
service that would be paid by Brazil.70
From there, the embassy became concerned in convincing London 
on the need to meet national expectations about the pomp and ceremony of 
signing the contract. “The Brazilian Navy attach considerable historical and 
emotional significance to this transaction which is the first major phase of 
the modernisation of their fleet”, said Hunt. And advised: “I support their 
attitude: the decision to by British was not an easy one for them in view of 
their close relationship with the United States”. Based on this, the Ambas-
sador suggested “that formal signature take place in the most impressive of 
circumstances you can arrange”, referring to the possibility of a meeting with 
the Queen.71
London, however, doubted that the involvement of the royal family 
was practicable, given scheduling difficulties (it would be the Monarch va-
cations) and the level of the Brazilian authorities. In 21 August, the Ministry 
of Defense supported the position of his colleagues in the FCO. In the end, 
the contract was signed in 29 September at the Admiralty House in London, 
attended by the Minister Delfim Netto and the Minister of Defence, and the 
high command of the Navy from that country.
Arms and foreign policy
In his report sent shortly after to London, Ambassador Hunt evaluat-
ed in triumphal terms the size and prospects of the business. Alluding to the 
sale of submarines, a year earlier, he said: “These two transactions, in addition 
to contributing massively to our growing exports to Brazil, should also if prop-
erly handled establish a dominant British technical influence in the Brazilian 
Navy for the next twenty years”.  Further, he described the historical trajectory 
of the Brazilian option for the British ships, citing the difficulties posed by 
the Americans to the most obvious option from Brazil to use their resources 
70  See telegram of 6 August FCO 7-1511. Totaling over 100 million pounds, the payments 
would be made every six months, in sixteen installments, the equivalent of 80% of the total 
price, starting on 01/04/76 and ending on 10/01/83. See telegram of August 26, 1970 in FCO 
7-1511.
71  Hunt to Foreign Office. October 5, 1970 in FCO 7-1511.
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to get the Bronstein frigate. Also alluding to the success of the official visit of 
Queen Elizabeth to Brazil in November 1968, accompanied by two Leander 
frigates of the Royal Navy, followed next year by the visit of a British squadron, 
which included two submarines of the Oberon class, the same class as those 
that would be built for our navy.
 According to the ambassador, later negotiations on the purchase of 
submarines of this class included the proposal of binding the signing of the 
contracts “to a promise of advantgeous financing for frigates and components 
supplied from Britain including local cost credits for some Brazilian construc-
tion” by the office of the British Embassy business. The proposal would have 
been formalized with the Brazilian Ministry of Finance on March 18, 1969 
“in a lettre handed to Admiral Adalberto Nunes, then Chief of the Brazilian 
Naval Staff”.72
The balance sheet was marked by vainglorious assessment of the Am-
bassador about the prospects opened up by the purchase of the frigates by the 
Brazilian Navy. He said: “The decision to adopt British designs as standard 
for the largest units in the new Brazilian fleet involves a decisive switch from 
U.S. to Brazilian standards and equipment not only in the ships themselves 
but in armament, supporting services and training systems”, what could 
mean “a proliferation of British export opportunities in many fields outside 
those covered by the main contracts”. “No less important”, he continued, “will 
be the renewal of close contacts between the two navies”, that could already 
be seen in the process of building of the submarines. “If we handle these op-
portunities well the next generation of Brazilian naval officers should speak 
English with the accents of Southampton or Barrow just as, almost to a man, 
as the present Captains and Commanders speak it (when they speak it at all) 
with those of Brooklyn and Newport News”.73
Such hopes were not limited to the naval sphere. For Sir David, “these 
contacts may assume increasing political importance” in the tables of Brazil-
ian tendency towards a “Southern Hemisphere Strategy”, which would involve 
72  See idem, p.5. It should be noted that this part of the negotiations is a new element, not 
mentioned until today in the official history of the Brazilian Navy. In the same document, Sir 
David Hunt mentions a story in which German option was impaired during the visit of Ger-
man ships to Brazil. On the occasion, when asked by Brazilian officials of how he evaluated 
his frigate, the captain of the German navy would have referred disparagingly to Köln frigates. 
See idem, p. 7.
73  As usual in the British diplomatic documentation, the Ambassador refers ironically to 
the limitations of the country where he is headquartered. For him, Vospers firm had to be 
commended for the patience with which negotiated with the Brazilian officials, what ensured 
success “for understanding that they should fulfill the formidable task of teaching Brazilians 
to build warships.”
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collaboration between Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, possibly being later 
extended to other nations such as Australia. In the diplomat’s view, although 
registering that such a strategy did not make much sense in terms of defense, 
it would interest the British, which could futurely provide frigates to these 
countries. The British representative concluded his enthusiastic assessment 
with special treatment recommendations to the Anglo-Brazilian relations. For 
those to work, it was necessary that his country imitated in some respects 
the American model of offering multiple advantages in military equipment 
negotiations.74
In fact, in subsequent years, the relationship between the two Navies 
was seen as one of the crucial aspects of relations between the UK and Brazil. 
Thus, writing to the Ambassador of Her Majesty in Brazil, to thank his annual 
report for the year 1974, the head of the Latin American Department of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hugh Carless, remembered:
The continuing connection and cooperation between the navies of Britain 
and Brazil form an important strand in the Anglo-Brazilian relationship. 
We should therefore be glad to have from you in due course a summary of 
your views on the role and future of the Brazilian Navy and the possibilities 
open to us for maintaining and possibly improving the good relations that 
now exist in the naval sector.75
Thus, the diplomatic documentation left no doubt about the impor-
tance of the frigates business for the British government, largely derived from 
the relevance of the naval defense industry in the economy of that country. 
As pointed out by the Dutch Sami Faltas, in his analysis of the European 
armaments market in the period between 1960 and 1980, unlike the United 
States and France, where prevails the aerospace industry, “in Britain and the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser degree in Italy and the F.R.G., the naval industry 
can be a more useful approach to the armaments industry as a whole. Its 
relative importance is larger in these countries and it is commercial and out-
ward-looking”.76 For him, until 1960, only Britain could produce their own 
ships, an aspect that has changed significantly in the following decades, with 
the development of the shipbuilding industry in several European countries. 
In this context, the British competitiveness comparatively decreased. At the 
same time, there was a clear internationalization of markets since the late 
74  On the Brazilian side, the negotiation ended with the award of the Order of Naval to Merit 
Ronald Dickinson on 26 November. He represented the British government in negotiations 
with the Brazilians.
75  See FCO 7-2761.
76  Op. cit., p. 18.
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1960’s. 77
But the most important to note is that the sale of warships is a State 
decision, in which politics and economics are closely linked. As noted by Fal-
tas:
Foreign policy considerations and other political factors affect every single 
decision to import or export warships. Buyers and sellers can use arms 
sales negotiations to reinforce or challenge existing spheres of influence. 
Negotiations on arms sales are regularly linked to other types of negotia-
tions on political military or economic relations.78
The same author emphasizes that arms negotiations are a two way 
street:
The major arms-supplying states use arms transfers to increase their in-
fluence on other states, both inside and outside their sphere of influence. 
For their part, arms importers use negotiations on arms deliveries either 
to enlist or enlarge the support of a major power for their policies, or to 
become less dependent on a single supplier. Buying one´s military equip-
ment from various suppliers makes one less susceptible to pressure from 
any single source.79
In this effort, of course, these countries were not looking for nuclear 
submarines or large surface ships. Sales hereby referred relate primarily to 
smaller ships: conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast 
attack equipment, minesweepers, amphibious ships and coastal patrol, etc.80  
It is worth noting, however, that purchases of escort ships were still divided 
half and half between the material used and new material, even in the late 
1970’s.81 In the buyer’s side, there were fewer countries able to acquire escort 
ships than smaller attack boats. In the supplier’s side, in the early 1970’s it 
begins to consolidate the trend of concentration of new warships industries in 
77  Idem, p.30-31, p.52 and following pages.
78  Idem, p.58.
79  Idem, p.59.
80  The same author thus describes the market share of these types of vessels in the period of 
1960-1980: 10% for conventional submarines; 28% to escort vessels; and 61% for fast boats. 
Op. Cit., p.66.
81  “In the field of destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, we find little evidence of change in modes 
of procurement throughout our period (1960-1980)”. And continued: “It is interesting to note 
that imports of used warships in the late seventies still accounted for more than half the overall 
demand for escort warships in the outside market, whereas domestic construction and new 
imports maintained a comparatively small share of the market”. Op. cit., p.67.
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Western Europe, where the technology contained in these equipment would 
be originated. At the same time, exports are the mainstay of European mili-
tary shipbuilding industry. According to the quoted author, “without warship 
exports, most naval industries could not continue at their present capacity, 
and several could not survive at all”.82 Another important trend in the supplier 
side in the period examined is the technology “transfer”, more precisely the 
manufacture of some ships of the same class in shipyards located in the pur-
chasing countries:
the period under review saw an increase in the number of transfers of 
warship-building technology from one country to other, an increase in the 
number of countries exporting such know-how, and an increase in the num-
ber of importing countries. An international market for warship-building 
technology seems to be emerging”,-  said Faltas referring to the 1970’s.83
In the first three post-war decades, the number of countries that built 
the aforementioned types of ships has significantly increased (from 9 to 37). 
As a result, the share of European suppliers in this market of warships tech-
nology “transfer” would rise from 10 to 70 percent during this decade, es-
pecially West Germany, whose share rose from nothing to 40 percent, with 
production mainly submarines and fast attack vessels.84 Some specifics mark 
the German naval industry: a long tradition in the construction of subma-
rines and other vessels; independence from the state and, to a lesser extent, 
restrictions on the export of military equipment. Nevertheless, a key factor 
in the German success was the willingness of its shipbuilding industry to 
satisfy the desire of buying countries such as Argentina and Turkey, of manu-
facturing their submarines locally.85 At the end of the decade, the importance 
of this type of business had grown to a point in which European marines 
changed their own equipment with an eye on its attractiveness to foreign buy-
er merchants.86  Another topic to be discussed is the growing importance of 
the equipment in shipbuilding. Europe was also able to maintain hegemony 
82  Idem, p.69.
83  Idem, p.73.
84  On the demander side, while in the 1950s countries such as Brazil did not receive virtually 
no technology “transfer”, in the late 1970’s, at least half of these businesses went to countries 
without advanced shipbuilding industry. Among them, there were Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, India, Ireland, Malaysia, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. 
Idem, p.75-77 and note 14, p.95.
85  Idem, p.79.
86  It was the British case of Type 2400 submarine and Type 23 frigates. Idem, p.83 and foot-
note 29, p. 96
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in this area, but in this case the difference between the weapons and other 
equipment installed on their ships and installed on boats sold to foreign na-
vies produced scale problems in European shipbuilding production, which 
shall not be minutely detailed hereby.87
The British were particularly willing to meet the demand for Navies 
such as the Brazilian for advanced technology frigates, for its own Navy had 
demanded such ships in previous years. Indeed, as NATO sought opposing 
to the Soviet Navy, it was especially relevant for the British shipbuilding in-
dustry to build escort ships.88 Some authors attribute this characteristic to 
the post-war economic situation - which led this country to focus on more af-
fordable alternatives - besides the naval strategy reasons: the prevailing belief, 
then, in the supremacy of air power, leading to emphasis on aircraft carriers, 
which needed escort vessels.89 Anyways, most of the ships produced in Brit-
ish shipyards during this period were frigates. This was the context in which 
the British developed the aforementioned Leander frigates, made between 
1961 and 1971, and considered a landmark to this type of ship.90 Hence, the 
early interest from the British government in strengthening its naval industri-
al park by selling frigates to countries such as Brazil. The fact of belonging to 
NATO, of course, did not mean that Britain did not actively compete with its 
allies in the search for markets for their ships.91 Finally, Brazilian purchases 
may have contributed to the brief peak of British naval military exports in the 
early 1970’s.
87  Faltas, op. cit., p.160.
88  As recalled by Eric Osborne, referring to the period of 1955-1967: “The naval power with 
the greatest output was Great Britain. In this period, destroyers and frigates smaller cam to 
represent the majority of the British surface fleet “. See Destroyers: an illustrated history of their 
impact, Santa Barbara / Denver / Oxford, ABC Clio, 2005, p.139.
89  To the author, “rightly or wrongly, the main objective of NATO doctrine appears to be to 
prevent a re-enactment of the Battle of the Atlantic, with Soviet submarines playing the part of 
German U-boats”.  See Sami Faltas, op. cit., p.28.
90  Leander constituted an evolution - in the design and the radar and air traffic control instal-
lations – from the commonly used British frigates, known as Type 12, developed in the 1950’s. 
The design of the Type 12 frigates, “in its various incarnations provided the backbone of the 
Royal Navy from about 1965 to 1985”. See Eric Grove, “Major surface combatants,” in Robert 
Gardiner (. Org), Navies in the nuclear age: warships since 1945, London, Conway Maritime Press, 
1993, p. 50-51. Osborne said some experts considered the frigates of this class among the best 
of its kind built in the era of missiles, op. cit., p. 252. Twenty-six ships were thrown overboard, 
fourteen more for export (six were made in the Netherlands and six in India). Measuring 372 
feet, they carried two guns of 4.5 inches, four missiles SAM Seacat, a MK 20 Limbo, and a 
Wasp helicopter. Moving 2350 tons. Some units were still in use in smaller navies in the early 
twenty-first century.
91  See Faltas, op. cit., p.27.
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In 1965, the so-called Geddes report, produced for the British govern-
ment, recommended that the domestic shipbuilding industry should focus 
on a small number of specialized shipyards, three for surface ships. In sub-
sequent years, the British Navy consolidated a trend to manufacture “leader” 
ships (lead, first in the class) in these shipyards and “follow-on” ships in a 
slightly larger number of firms. In the analysis of Faltas, 
for the specialist warship builders – Vickers, Vosper Thornycroft, Yarrow and 
Brooke Marine – specialisation meant a virtually total dependence on the 
government for the provision of Royal Navy orders and for help in securing 
export contracts for warships.92
He argued that, in the 1970’s, the militarization of some of the largest 
and most modern shipyards was clear, guaranteed by national and interna-
tional orders.93 Among the British companies in the early 1970’s, Vosper was 
the only one exclusively specialized in medium-sized vessels, and, on the list 
of experts, was the newest one.94 Therefore, it was crucial for this firm the 
design of Amazon class frigates, developed in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Defense. This project would result in the MK-10 and MK-11 models, from 
which originated our Niterói class. The importance attached by both Vosper 
and by the British government to the sale of frigates to Brazil has to be seen 
in this broader context.
In May 1976, President Geisel made his state visit to the UK. At that 
time, the domestic opposition in UK came to an apex, including from the 
Labour Party itself, which was in power. It opposed to the approach of the Brit-
ish government with the Brazilian dictatorship. Without understanding the 
history of Anglo-Brazilian naval relations, it is difficult to understand a fun-
damental aspect of the relations between the two countries in the 1970’s. At 
the end of that decade, Brazilian military purchases in Britain were varied and 
substantial. In this context, the history of relations between Brazil and Europe 
during the military dictatorship had new meanings if considered an aspect 
so far largely ignored in the context of the relationship between democracy 
and dictatorship: military relations, especially in the case of Anglo-Brazilian 
92  See chart 27 in op. cit, p.204: “Specialisation in British warship building”.
93  Between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s, the percentage of shipbuilding within the produc-
tion from British shipyards went from 16% to 42%. See Faltas, cit., p. 205.
94  “And of course that, being the youngest, the Vosper had a big dispute with the other ship-
yards. The battleships were Vickers, Saldanha, which was our training ship, Vickers. The Ar-
gentine Navy also bought in Scotland. Then the Vosper did a really great effort - and perhaps 
some advantages have arisen therefrom to Brazil - to get contracts. “ Cited testimony of Fer-
nando Costa to the author.
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relations towards the naval arms rapprochement between the two countries 
in the 1970’s.
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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the case of the acquisition of Vosper frigates by the Brazi-
lian Navy, which took place in early 1970. Besides being an illustrative case of foreign 
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of nations. The business of frigates is considered strategic for the relationship bet-
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